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FORFEITURES IN NARCOTICS CASES: THE 
CONSTITUTION AND RECENT AMENDMENTS TO 
MARYLAND'S FORFEITURE STATUTE 
Douglas Clark Hollmannt 
Each year Americans spend almost eighty br1lion dollars on ille-
gal drugs. The government's ability to confiscate property is 
perhaps its most poweiful weapon in battling illegal drug traf-
ficking. Amendments to Maryland's foifeiture provision have 
recently expanded the categories of foifeitable property. In this 
article, the author analyzes the amendments, with an emphasis 
on the fourth amendment/imitations on foifeitures. The author 
concludes that the seizure of property for foifeiture requires a 
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, and that 
the exclusionary rule provides an ineffective remedy for fourth 
amendment violations in the foifeiture context. The author con-
tends that the dismissal of a foifeiture should be the remedy for 
illegal seizures of foifeitable property. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Forfeitures in narcotics cases are governed by article 27, section 
297 of the Annotated Code ofMaryland. 1 In 1982, the General Assem-
bly significantly amended section 297 to expand the types of property 
involved in narcotics violations that can be forfeited to the state.2 This 
expansion will accelerate the already increasing use of this tool by law 
enforcement agencies in combating narcotics traffickers.3 In addition, 
attempts to seize and forfeit the new categories of property included in 
section 297 will focus attention upon a facet of forfeiture law not often 
considered by courts: the relationship between the fourth amendment 
and seizures of forfeitable property. This article will discuss the legal 
principles that are unique to forfeiture law, the significance of the re-
cent amendments to section 297, and the application of the fourth 
amendment to seizures of property subject to forfeiture.4 
t B.A., 1964, Duke University; LL.B., 1967, Columbia University School of Law; 
Partner, Goodman, Cohen & Bennett, P.A., Annapolis, Maryland. The author 
formerly served as a trial attorney in the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section of 
the Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, where he dealt exten-
sively with forfeitures. The author wishes to thank Catherine Potthast for her 
assistance. 
l. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1982 & Supp. 1983). 
2. See infra notes 66-llO and accompanying text. 
3. In the first year after the adoption by Congress of a similar forfeiture provision, 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized $13,000 in assets; in the 
second year of operation, DEA seized $94,000,000 in assets. Hearings on S. 83 
Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee of the Maryland General Assem-
bly, 1982 Legislative Sess. (testimony of Charles Olender, Chief of Financial In-
vestigation Division, DEA) (hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 83]. 
4. The due process limitations upon the state's right to forfeit property will not be 
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II. FORFEITURE LAW-AN OVERVIEW 
The concept of forfeitures was recognized in the Bible6 and has 
been a part of American law since the beginning of the Republic.7 
While this article is limited to a discussion of forfeiture law as it relates 
to narcotics cases, certain principles apply to all forfeitures. 8 First, a 
forfeiture is a civil action in rem.9 Second, the seized object is the sub-
ject of the suit rather than its owner, and the suit is unrelated to any 
criminal proceeding. 10 Third, since a forfeiture is a civil proceeding, 
given extensive treatment in this article. See infra note 208. One due process 
issue that may arise in the forfeiture context is whether the owner of seized prop-
erty is entitled to preseizure notice and hearing. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson 
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (preseizure hearing not required). For a 
discussion of due process and the forfeiture of automobiles under Maryland's stat-
ute, see Comment, Due Process in Automobile Foifeiture Proceedings, 3 U. BALT. 
L. REv. 270 (1974). A second issue that arises is whether delay between the time 
of seizure and the institution of forfeiture proceedings violates due process. See 
United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars in United 
States Currency, 103 S. Ct. 2005 (1983) (18 month delay did not violate due pro-
cess); see also Jonesv. State, 56 Md. App. 101, 117-18,466 A.2d 895,903-04 (1983) 
(three month delay between state's knowledge of narcotics violation and seizure of 
vehicle did not violate due process); see generally Kandaras, Federal Property For-
feiture Statutes: The Need to Guarantee A Prompt Trial, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 195 
(1981) (discussing due process implications of delay); Kandaras, Federal Property 
Foifeiture Statutes: The Need for Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. L.J. 925 
( 1980) (discussing due process and delay); see also i'!fra note 197 (cases advocating 
dismissal of forfeiture as remedy for due process violations). 
5. A forfeiture is a "deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence of the non-
performance of some obligation or condition." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 585 
(5th ed. 1979); see 36 AM. JuR. 2o Foifeitures and Penalties § I (1968). 
6. "If an ox gore a man or a woman and they die, he shall be stoned and his flesh not 
eaten." Exodus 21:28. 
7. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 29, 39, 47 (repealed 1790). 
8. For a recent discussion of these principles that, although made in a gambling case, 
reflect the current view of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, see Director of Fin. 
v. Cole, 296 Md. 607, 465 A.2d 450 (1983). 
9. Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655,284 A.2d 203 (1971). 
This article will not discuss the concept of criminal forfeiture. Criminal forfeiture 
is an in personam suit against the felon; the forfeiture does not lie unless the felon 
is convicted of the underlying crime. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974). Although the First Congress specifically re-
jected this concept, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, I Stat. 117 (current version at 
18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982)), Congress in 1970 revived this form of forfeiture when it 
included criminal forfeiture provisions in two laws. Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, § 90l(a), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 943 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1963(c) (1982)) (governing racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations 
(RICO)); Controlled Substances Act, § 408(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 
1265-66 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982)) (applies to continuing 
criminal enterprise offenses). A bill pending in Congress would expand the avail-
ability of criminal forfeitures under the Controlled Substances Act. H.R. 4901, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 104(m) (1984). As this issue went to press, this bill was 
incorporated into H.R. 3291, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., and enacted as Pub. L. No. 98-
573 (1984). 
10. Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 261, 267 (1878); Prince 
George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 658, 284 A.2d 203, 205 
(1971). 
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the state's burden is met if it proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the property was used or intended for use in violation of a criminal 
statute. 11 This burden is considerably less than that in criminal cases. 12 
Fourth, since a forfeiture proceeding is a civil action in rem, it is of 
little significance whether there is a criminal conviction. Indeed, the 
innocence of the owner of the seized property is not a defense to a 
forfeiture action.D Thus, even though a defendant/owner of forfeita-
ble property is acquitted of the criminal charges, the property may nev-
ertheless be forfeited to the state.14 
Forfeiture laws are derived from the ancient concept of deodand.l5 
Because this concept was never accepted by American courts as part of 
the common law, 16 forfeiture in the United States is a creature of statu-
tory law.J7 Federal forfeiture statutes are more extensive than those 
found in Maryland. For example, federal provisions allow the forfei-
ture of property used in connection with narcotics, 18 aliens, 19 fire-
arms,20 liquor violations,21 customs violations,22 gambling violations,23 
contraband,24 and counterfeiting.25 In Maryland, however, forfeitures 
are primarily restricted to property used in connection with narcotics, 26 
11. State v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 266 Md. 275, 277, 292 A.2d 64, 66 (1972). 
12. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (prosecution must prove guilt of the de-
fendant beyond a reasonable doubt). 
13. Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 659, 284 A.2d 203, 
205 ( 1971 ). The court of appeals has held that a court does not have discretion or 
any basis to deny a forfeiture if the state proves the statutory elements. State v. 
One 1967 Ford Mustang, 266 Md. 275, 279, 292 A.2d 64, 66 (1972). 
14. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099 (1984); see One 
Lot of Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam); 
United States v. 1977 Lincoln Mark V, 453 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); 
Bozman v. Office of Fin., 52 Md. App. l, 445 A.2d 1073 (1982), aff'd, 296 Md. 492, 
463 A.2d 832 (1983). 
15. A deodand is "any personal chattel whatever, animate or inanimate, which, be-
coming the immediate instrument by which the death of a human creature was 
caused, was forfeited to the king .... " Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 
509,510, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916). The concept was abused to provide property for 
favorites of the king. Id In 1846, England abolished deodand by statute. 940 
Viet. ch. 62 (1846). 
16. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974). 
17. United States v. Lane Motor Co., 199 F.2d 495, 496-97 (lOth Cir. 1952), ajf'd, 344 
U.S. 630 (1953). But see State v. 158 Gaming Devices, 59 Md. App. 44, 474 A.2d 
545, cert. granted, 301 Md. 44 (1984). 
18. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a) (1982). 
19. 8 u.s.c. § 1324(b) (1982). 
20. 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1982); 26 U.S.C. § 5872(a) (1982). 
21. 18 u.s.c. § 3615 (1982). 
22. 46 U.S.C. § 325 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1082(c)(3), 1955(d) (1982); see 26 U.S.C. § 4412 (1982) (construed to 
permit forfeiture, see United States v. 1978 Cadillac El Dorado 2-Door Coupe, 
489 F. Supp. 532 (D. Utah 1980)). 
24. 49 u.s.c. § 782 (1976). 
25. Id 
26. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1982 & Supp. 1983). 
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gambling or lottery violations,27 alcoholic beverages,2s and handguns.29 
III. RECENT AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 297 
The recent amendments to section 297 have significantly expanded 
the availability of forfeiture in narcotics cases. A discussion of the his-
tory of Maryland's forfeiture statutes will illustrate the impact of these 
new amendments. 
A. The Law Prior to the 1982 Amendments 
In 1951, the General Assembly enacted the first Maryland forfei-
ture provision dealing with narcotics. 30 The scope of this original at-
tempt to exercise the power to forfeit property was extremely limited, 
reaching only vehicles used in connection with violations of the narcot-
ics law.31 A vehicle could not be forfeited unless the state established 
that the person using the vehicle had been convicted of the underlying 
crime and that the owner had authorized the illegal use.32 
This rather narrow forfeiture provision was superseded in 1970 by 
section 297. In 1971, Congress amended the federal provision relating 
to forfeitures in narcotics cases.33 Both the federal and Maryland stat-
utes were modeled on the Uniform Controlled Substances Act34 and 
were not only parallel in format but contained identical language in 
many places.35 Because of the similarities between the two statutes, the 
27. Id § 264(a) (1982). 
28. ld art. 2C, § 3 (1981). 
29. ld art. 27, § 36C (1982). 
30. 1951 Mo. LAWS 471 (current version at Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 297 (1982 & 
Supp. 1983)). 
31. The 1951 forfeiture provision read as follows: 
In addition to any other fines or penalties provided for a violation 
of the provisions of this subtitle, any motor vehicle or other vehicle, ves-
sel or aircraft used or employed in the concealment, conveying or trans-
porting of any such narcotic drugs, or used during the course of any 
violation of this subtitle by any person or persons convicted of the same, 
shall upon the conviction or convictions be declared by the court to be 
forfeited to the county or to Baltimore City, as the case may be; provided 
that no vehicle shall be forfeited hereunder unless the owner thereof au-
thorized or permitted such use or employment. The county commission-
ers or the mayor and city council of Baltimore at their discretion may 
use the said vehicle for public purposes or may exchange, sell or convey 
it to another person or persons; and any cash or moneys received there-
for shall be added to the general funds of the county or City of 
Baltimore. 
1951 MD. LAWS 471 (first codified at Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 301 (1957)) (cur-
rent version at id § 297 (1982 & Supp. 1983)). 
32. These requirements were added during consideration of Senate Bill 406, which 
became article 27, section 301 of the 1957 Code. 
33. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1970) (current version at id (1982)). 
34. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, 9 U.L.A. 187 (1970). 
35. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 88l(b) (1970) (former federal version) with Mo. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, § 297(b) (1971) (former Maryland provision). 
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construction of the federal statute has been helpful in determining the 
meaning of the Maryland statute.36 
Section 297, as enacted in 1970, provided for the forfeiture of six 
categories of property: (1) controlled dangerous substances ("CDS"); 
(2) raw materials, products, and equipment; (3) containers; (4) "convey-
ances" such as vehicles, aircraft, and vessels; (5) books, records, and 
research; and (6) currency.37 The first five categories, taken from the 
36. See Prince George's County v. One 1969 Opel, 267 Md. 491, 298 A.2d 168 (1973) 
(relying on federal statute); Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 
Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971) (same). 
37. The 1970 version of section 297, as amended through 1981, provided: 
(a) Property subject to forfeiture.- The following shall be subject to 
forfeiture and no property right shall exist in them: 
(l) All controlled dangerous substances which have been manufactured, 
distributed, dispensed, acquired, or possessed in violation of the provi-
sions of this subheading; 
(2) All raw materials, products and equipment of any kind which are 
used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, 
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled dangerous substance 
in violation of the provisions of this subheading; 
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for 
property described in paragraphs (1); 
(4) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are 
used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property de-
scribed in (1) or (2), except that, 
(i) No conveyance used by any person as a common carrier or vehicle 
for hire in the transaction of business as a common carrier or vehicle for 
hire shall be seized or forfeited under this subheading unless it appears 
that the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance was a con-
senting party or privy to a violation of this subheading; and 
(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section 
by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to 
have been committed or omitted by any person other than such owner 
while such conveyance was unlawfully in the possession of a person 
other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States, or of any state; 
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, 
tapes, and data which are used or intended for use, in violation of this 
subheading; 
(6) All money or currency which shall be found in close proximity to 
contraband controlled dangerous substances or controlled paraphernalia 
or which otherwise has been used or intended for use in connection with 
the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession of con-
trolled dangerous substances or controlled paraphernalia. 
This money or currency shall be deemed to be contraband of law 
and all rights, title and interest in and to the money or currency shall 
immediately vest in and to Baltimore City or the county in which it was 
seized, the municipal corporation, if seized by municipal authorities, or, 
if it was seized by State authorities, the State; and no such money or 
currency shall be returned to any person claiming it, or to any other 
person, except in the manner hereinafter provided and; 
(7) All drug paraphernalia as prohibited by § 287 A of this article, and 
controlled paraphernalia as prohibited by § 287 of this article. 
Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 297(a) (1982) (amended version at id (Supp. 1983)). 
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Uniform Controlled Substances Act,38 have been the subject of much 
litigation, particularly the category dealing with conveyances.39 This 
litigation has resulted because conveyances are by far the largest class 
of objects seized and because it is easy to claim that an automobile, 
boat, or airplane, unlike contraband per se,40 has been seized unjustly. 
As a result of this litigation, detailed provisions relating to the forfei-
ture of motor vehicles have been included in the Maryland statute.41 
38. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AcT, 9 U.L.A. 187 (1970). The first five catego-
ries have also been adopted in substantial part by Congress in its forfeiture enact-
ment, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982), and by at least 46 states and the District of 
Columbia. ALA. CODE§ 20-2-93 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.110 (1983); ARIZ. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-106 (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2629 (Supp. 
1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 11470-11472 (West 1975 & Supp. 1983); 
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 2la-246(d) (Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4784 
(1975 & Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-552 (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 893.12, 932.70l(e) (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE§ 16-13-32 (1983); 
HAWAII REV. STAT.§ 329-55 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE§ 37-2744 (1977 & Supp. 
1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 l/2, § 1505 (Smith-Hurd 1976 & Supp. 1983); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 16-6-8.5 to -8.51 (Bums 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 204.505 (West 
Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4135 (1980); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 218A.270 (Baldwin 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1550 (West Supp. 1984); 
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2387 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 297 
(1982 & Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 47 (West 1984); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7521 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.19 (West 
Supp. 1984); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 41-29-153 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§§ 195.140, 195.145 (Vernon 1983); MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 44-12-102 (1983); NEB. 
REv. STAT.§ 28-431 (Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 453.301 (1972); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN.§ 318B:l7b (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C-64-l (West 1982); N.M. 
STAT. ANN.§ 30-31-34 (Supp. 1983); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 3387 (McKinney 
1977 & Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 90-112 (1976 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. 
CODE§ 19-03.1-36 (1981 & Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-503 (West 
1973 & Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-128 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 21-28-5.04 to -5.05 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 44-
53-520 (Law. Co-op. 1962 & Supp. 1983); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 34-20B-70 
(1977 & Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 53-11-409 (1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. art. 4476-15, § 5.03 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 58-
37-13 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-249 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 69.50.505 (1970 & Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE§ 60A-5-505 (1977); WIS. STAT. 
ANN.§ 161.55 (West 1974 & Supp. 1983); WYo. STAT.§ 35-7-1049 (1977 & Supp. 
1983). Several other jurisdictions retain forfeiture provisions patterned after the 
older Uniform Narcotics Drug Act. CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 18-17-106 (Supp. 1983); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2925.13 (Page 1982); OR. REV. STAT.§ 167.247 (1981); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4219, 4227 (1982). 
39. E.g., United States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Aircraft, 604 F.2d 27 (8th 
Cir. 1979); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d 
Cir. 1977); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 2-Door Hardtop, 529 F.2d 65 
(9th Cir. 1976); United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 
1974). 
40. Contraband per se is property that is inherently illegal to possess. Director of Fin. 
v. Cole, 296 Md. 607, 619, 465 A.2d 450, 457 (1983). In contrast, derivative con-
traband is property that is legal to possess, but which is subject to forfeiture if 
used illegally or if it is connected with illegal activity. /d. Conveyances are in the 
second category. 
41. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(4) (Supp. 1983) (exemptions for com-
mon carriers and stolen vehicles); id. § 297(f) (procedures for forfeiture). See gen-
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Failure of the authorities to comply with these provisions may result in 
the defeat of the forfeiture action.42 
The sixth category, subsection 297(a)(6), dealt with the forfeiture 
of currency. This unique provision contained two separate bases for 
the forfeiture of currency. The first part of the subsection focused on 
the "proximity" of the currency to CDS, and permitted the forfeiture of 
"all money or currency which shall be found in close proximity to con-
traband controlled dangerous substances or controlled parapherna-
lia .... "43 The second part of the subsection allowed for the 
forfeiture of currency that was "connected" with drug activity: "or 
which otherwise has been used or intended for use in connection with 
the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession of con-
trolled dangerous substances or controlled paraphemalia."44 
The question raised by this provision is whether the language re-
quiring proximity is modified by the language requiring a connection 
with a CDS violation. If so, currency found in close proximity to CDS 
would need more than mere proximity to the contraband to be forfeita-
ble. If not, mere proximity would appear to be enough. More tradi-
tional bases for forfeiture rely upon some association beyond mere 
proximity to support a forfeiture action.45 Despite the statutory ambi-
guity, the Maryland cases that have considered the concept of "close 
proximity" have not attempted to resolve the issue. 
In Gatewood v. State,46 police seized a paper bag containing cash, 
heroin, and marijuana from the defendant. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland dismissed the defendant's objection to the forfeiture with the 
following language: 
The proximity point requires little discussion. The uncontro-
verted testimony was that the cash, the heroin and the mari-
erally Comment, supra note 4 (discussing procedures for forfeiting automobiles in 
Maryland). 
42. E.g., State v. One 1980 Harley Davidson Motorcycle, 57 Md. App. 178, 469 A.2d 
487 (1984); State v. One 1979 Pontiac Firebird, 55 Md. App. 394, 462 A.2d 73 
(1983); see Prince George's County v. One 1969 Opel, 267 Md. 491, 298 A.2d 168 
(1973). 
43. Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 297 (a)(6) (1982) (current version at id. (Supp. 1983)) 
(emphasis supplied). At least five other states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted provisions that appear to permit the forfeiture of currency found in close 
proximity to CDS. See ALA. ConE§ 20-2-93 (1975); D.C. ConE ANN. § 33-552 
(Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE§ 37-2744 (1977 & Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 
l/2, § 1505 (Smith-Hurd 1976 & Supp. 1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 218A.270 
(Baldwin 1982); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 44-53-520 (Law. Co-op. 1962 & Supp. 1983). 
44. Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (1982) (current version at id. (Supp. 1983)) 
(emphasis supplied). 
45. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 297(a)(l)-(5) (Supp. 1983) (categories of forfeitable 
property require some type of illegal use prior to forfeiture); cf Bozman v. Office 
of Fin., 296 Md. 492, 510, 463 A.2d 832, 842 (1983) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) 
(money is not contraband per se; whether it is contraband depends upon its con-
nection with CDS). 
46. 268 Md. 349, 301 A.2d 498 (1973). 
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juana were in the same brown paper bag. The fact that the 
cash happened to be in a bank money sack which was also in 
the paper bag can scarcely be said to negate the concept of 
proximity, and the lower court so found. 47 
In the recent case of Bozman v. Office of Finance ,48 the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland upheld the forfeiture of currency discov-
ered in the same room as the contraband. The Bozman court declined 
to define close proximity, remarking that: "[w]e liken 'close proximity' 
to Justice Stewart's comment on pornography. We do not define it, but 
we know it when we see it."49 The court of appeals affirmed the deci-
sion, and only briefly discussed close proximity.50 The court found that 
these two words "have relative rather than precise definitions. Thus, 
the interpretation of both depends upon the facts and circumstances 
existing in connection with their application."51 Since there was no ex-
planation for the presence of the drugs and the money in the same 
room, the court of appeals upheld the trial judge's determination that 
the drugs and money were in close proximity.52 
The second part of the currency provision, which provided for the 
forfeiture of money used "in connection with" drug activity,53 has 
rarely been used by Maryland law enforcement authorities. Each of 
the three Maryland decisions discussing the currency provisions of sub-
section (6) deals with currency found in close proximity to CDS. 54 The 
failure of narcotics agents to seize and forfeit currency used in connec-
tion with CDS violations may be attributable to their traditionally defi-
cient skills in the handling of financial investigations. 55 Until recently 
47. Id at 353-54, 301 A.2d at 500-01; see also Geppi v. State, 270 Md. 239, 245, 310 
A.2d 768,771 (1973) (question of whether more than mere proximity was required 
to forfeit currency was raised but not discussed). 
48. 52 Md. App. 1, 445 A.2d 1073 (1982), ajf'd, 296 Md. 492, 463 A.2d 832 (1983). 
49. Bozman, 52 Md. App. at 4-5, 445 A.2d at 1073-75 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
50. Bozman, 296 Md. 492, 463 A.2d 832 (1983), ajf'g 52 Md. App. 1, 445 A.2d 1073 
(1982). 
51. /d. at 501, 463 A.2d at 837. 
52. Id 
53. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (1971) (current version at id (Supp. 1983)). 
54. Geppi v. State, 270 Md. 239, 310 A.2d 768 (1973); Gatewood v. State, 268 Md. 
349, 301 A.2d 498 (1973); Bozman v. Office of Fin., 52 Md. App. l, 445 A.2d 1073 
(1982), ajf'd, 296 Md. 492, 463 A.2d 832 (1983). It is doubtful, however, that the 
number of reported cases on forfeitures accurately reflects the actual number of 
forfeitures. Unlike criminal prosecutions, which are difficult for a defendant to 
avoid, forfeiture proceedings can be ignored with impunity since the only penalty 
for failing to contest the action is the forfeiture of the property itself. A challenge 
to the forfeiture requires an explanation of where the property came from and 
who was using it. This information is admissible in a subsequent criminal prose-
cution or tax proceeding. Many forfeitures are uncontested and it may be that the 
property owners choose to disavow any connection, legal or otherwise, rather than 
risk closer examination by law enforcement authorities. 
55. The DEA began financial investigation training for its agents and supervisors in 
1979. A course is now offered in the history of banking, the Federal Reserve 
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the investigator's drive to seize drugs obscured other ways of combating 
narcotics traffickers. 56 
Under the 1970 Maryland act, money and currency were the only 
types of forfeitable financial property.57 Other financial assets such as 
negotiable instruments or precious metals were not covered, even if 
there was a connection with a narcotics violation. It should be recog-
nized, however, that the 1970 Maryland provision allowing the seizure 
of money and currency was broader than the forfeiture laws enacted in 
most other jurisdictions.58 The Uniform Controlled Substances Act59 
and the federal forfeiture statute,60 as well as the law in nearly every 
other state, provided only for the forfeiture of property that fit into one 
of the five specified categories.61 Money and currency were not in-
cluded in those categories. Since the state's right to forfeit property 
depends upon statutory law,62 forfeitable property must be enumerated 
in a specific statutory provision. In those states lacking a "currency" 
category, money as well as the proceeds of CDS transactions, negotia-
ble instruments, and stocks and bonds are not forfeitable. For exam-
ple, a raid on a drug operation could result in the seizure and forfeiture 
of CDS, the laboratory equipment, the records used by the organiza-
tion, containers for CDS, and any vehicles used in the operation. Ex-
cept in Maryland and a few other states, 63 piles of cash on the same 
System, the Financial Privacy and Bank Secrecy Act, net worth and concealment 
income analysis, as well as the review of forfeiture statutes. See CoMPTROLLER 
GENERAL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSET FORFEITURE-A SELDOM 
USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING I (1981). According to the 
Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commission, while no comparable 
training seminars are held for Maryland law enforcement officers at the present 
time, one is being prepared. Telephone interview with Carl Bart, Staff Member of 
Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commission (May 4, 1984). 
56. Meyers, Dealers, Dollars and Drugs, 9 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 7 (Summer 1972); 
Comment, Criminal Foifeiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension of Organized 
Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 227 (1982). 
57. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (1982) (current version at id. (Supp. 1983)). 
58. Forfeiture laws of other jurisdictions that allowed for the forfeiture of money and 
currency, see supra note 43 & infra note 63 (listing current versions), were pre-
ceded by the 1970 Maryland enactment. The comparable federal provision was 
not enacted until 1978. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, § 301, Pub. L. No. 
95-633, 92 Stat. 3777 (1978) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (1982)). 
59. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AcT, 9 U.L.A. 187 (1970). 
60. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1970) (current version at id. (1982)). 
61. The five categories are: CDS; raw materials, products and equipment; containers; 
conveyances; and books, records, and research. See supra note 38 (listing current 
versions of state forfeiture provisions). 
62. Absent a statute, there is no common law right of forfeiture. Parker-Harris Co. v. 
Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 510, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916); see supra notes 16-17 and ac-
companying text. 
63. Idaho and Illinois statutory law would seem to allow seizures of currency without 
requiring any showing other than proximity. IDAHO CoDE § 37-2744 (1977 & 
Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, § 1505 (Smith-Hurd 1976 & Supp. 
1983). A number of other states permit seizures of currency if there is a connec-
tion with CDS activity beyond proximity. ALA. CoDE§ 20-2-93 (1975); ALASKA 
STAT.§ 17.30.110 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-106 (Supp. 1983); ARK. 
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table with the equipment and the CDS could not be seized and 
forfeited. 
As drug trafficking increased during the 1970's, law enforcement 
authorities began to realize that they could not seize many assets con-
nected with narcotics violations under existing statutes. The result has 
been a flurry of recent amendments to federal and state forfeiture 
laws.64 In 1978 Congress amended the federal statute to permit the 
seizure and forfeiture of a wide range of financial assets connected with 
CDS activity.65 Four years later, Maryland followed suit when the 
1982 General Assembly enacted a substantially similar provision. 
B. The 1982 Amendments 
The 1982 amendments to section 297 revised the currency category 
in subsection (6). The amendments added a new subsection (8) that 
greatly expanded the types of property that can be forfeited. 66 To un-
derstand fully the range of assets now subject to forfeiture in narcotics 
cases, subsections (6) and (8) must be read together.67 
STAT. ANN.§ 82-2629 (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 893.12, 932.70l(e) (West 
1976 & Supp. 1983); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 329-55 (Supp. 1982); KY. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 218A.270 (Baldwin 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 32-1550 (West Supp. 
1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2387 (Supp. 1983); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. 
ch. 94C, § 47 (West 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 152.19 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. 
CODE ANN.§ 41-29-153 (Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 318B:l7b (1982); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C-64-l (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-34 (Supp. 
1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-520 (Law. Co-op. 1962 & Supp. 1983); TENN. 
CoDE ANN.§ 53-11-409 (1983); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 5.03 
(Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1983); VA. CoDE § 18.2-249 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. 
§ 161.55 (West 1974 & Supp. 1983). 
64. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 893.12, 932.70l(e) (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); HAWAII 
REv. STAT. § 329-55 (Supp. 1982). See generally supra note 38 (listing statutes). 
Indeed, a bill is now pending in the House of Representatives that would further 
expand the categories of forfeitable property to include land and buildings used to 
store CDS. H.R. 4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 102(a) (1984) (proposed Compre-
hensive Drug Penalty Act of 1984). See supra note 9. 
65. As amended in 1978, the federal statute provided: 
All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value 
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a 
controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds tracea-
ble to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and 
securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this 
subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this para-
graph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or 
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted 
without the knowledge or consent of that owner. 
21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (Supp. II 1978) (current version at id (1982)). 
66. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(6), (8) (Supp. 1983). The General Assembly 
enacted subsection (7) in 1980 to provide for the forfeiture of drug paraphernalia. 
This category of property, which relates more to a possessory offense than to a 
trafficking violation, will not be discussed in this article. 
67. Introduced as Senate Bill 83, this amendment became 1982 Mo. LAWS 472 (codi-
fied at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(6), (8) (Supp. 1983)). The General As-
sembly amended subsection (6) to provide for the forfeiture of: 
All money, coin, or currency which has been used or intended for use in 
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1. Subsection (6): Money, Coin, or Currency 
Subsection (6) of section 297(a), dealing with the forfeiture of 
money and currency, has been amended more in style than in sub-
stance. "Money or currency" is now "money, coin, or currency."68 The 
language providing for the forfeiture of money or currency "used or 
intended for use" in violation of the CDS laws has been moved so that 
the emphasis of the subsection is now clearly on the connection with 
CDS activity, rather than the proximity of the money to CDS.69 
Despite the statute's shift in emphasis, the physical proximity of 
money to CDS continues to be relevant under the amended statute. 
The amendments to subsection (6) create a rebuttable presumption that 
money, coin, or currency found in close proximity to CDS and other 
forfeitable property is forfeitable. 70 This presumption is necessary in 
light of the difficulty of proving a connection, absent other evidence, 
with CDS activity. Although there are constitutional constraints on the 
use of presumptions in criminal proceedings, 71 the rebuttable presump-
tion of section 297 is unaffected since a forfeiture is a civil action in 
rem. 
An example posited in a dissent by Judge Eldridge serves to illus-
trate the impact of the amendments to subsection (6). Prior to the 1982 
amendments, the close proximity rule of subsection (6) would have al-
lowed the forfeiture of "the entire contents of a bank vault . . . if one 
safe deposit box were found to contain controlled dangerous substances 
connection with the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing or pos-
session of controlled dangerous substances or controlled paraphernalia. 
All money, coin, or currency which is found in close proximity to contra-
band controlled dangerous substances, controlled paraphernalia, or for-
feitable records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of 
controlled dangerous substances are presumed to be forfeitable under 
this paragraph. The burden of proof is upon a claimant of the property 
to rebut this presumption. 
This money or currency shall be deemed to be contraband of law 
and all rights, title and interest in and to the money or currency shall 
immediately vest in and to Baltimore City or the county in which it was 
seized, the municipal corporation, if seized by municipal authorities, or, 
if it was seized by State authorities, the State; and no such money or 
currency shall be returned to any person claiming it, or to any other 
person, except in the manner hereinafter provided. 
ld § 297(a)(6). The new subsection (8) provides for the forfeiture of: 
Everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange 
for a controlled dangerous substance in violation of this subheading, all 
proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all negotiable instruments 
and securities used, or intended to be used, to facilitate any violation of 
this subheading. 
ld § 297(a)(8). 
68. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (Supp. 1983) (emphasis supplied). For the 
text of this provision, see supra note 67. 
69. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (Supp. 1983). 
70./d 
71. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 422 U.S. 140, 157-63 (1979). 
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[B]ecause the surrounding boxes would be in 'close proximity' to 
the drug containing box, all the money or currency contained within 
them would be subject to forfeiture."72 The 1982 amendments to sub-
section (6) permit owners of the safe deposit boxes to come forward 
and rebut the presumption that the contents of these boxes had a con-
nection with the CDS violations. 
The amended subsection (6) subjects money, coin, and currency to 
forfeiture if it has been used or intended for use "in connection with" a 
violation of the CDS laws.73 In contrast, subsection (8) of section 
297(a) provides for the forfeiture of negotiable instruments and securi-
ties that "facilitate" CDS violations.74 This use of two similar but dif-
ferent terms in one statute implies that, arguably at least, a situation 
may exist where money, coin, or currency has some "connection" with 
a violation of CDS laws but does not "facilitate" the violation.75 The 
federal forfeiture statute subjects vehicles to forfeiture if they "facili-
tate" a CDS transaction.76 Not every situation involving a vehicle, 
72. Bozman v. Office of Fin., 296 Md. 492, 511 n.4, 463 A.2d 832, 842 n.4 ( 1983) 
(Eldridge & Davidson, JJ., dissenting). 
73. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (Supp. 1983). 
74. Id § 297(a)(8). 
75. The dichotomy of the language is probably the result of an attempt to engraft 
provisions of the DEA's model forfeiture provision onto the existing Maryland 
statute. Because of the success with the 1978 amendment to the federal forfeiture 
provision, the DEA has been supporting similar amendments to state statutes. 
The 1982 amendment to section 297 was in part a result of these efforts. The DEA 
model forfeiture act provides: 
Everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange 
for a controlled substance in violation of this Act (meaning the Con-
trolled Substances Act of this State), all proceeds traceable to such an 
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used, 
or intended to be used, to facilitate any violation of this Act; except that 
no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the 
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by him 
to have been committed or omitted without his knowledge or consent. 
Rebullable Presumption: All moneys, coin, and currency found in close 
proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, to forfeitable drug manu-
facturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable records of the 
importation, manufacture or distribution of controlled substances, are 
presumed to be forfeitable under this paragraph. The burden of proof is 
upon claimants of property to rebut this presumption. 
MODEL FORFEITURE OF DRUG PROFITS AcT (DEA, United States Dep't of Jus-
tice 1981) (emphasis supplied) (copy of act with drafters' comments available at 
the University of Baltimore Law Review). 
76. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4) (1982). Several courts have adopted a test requiring the 
facilitation to have a "substantial" or "significant" connection with the CDS vio-
lation. Eg., United States v. One (l) Liberian Refrigerator Vessel, 447 F. Supp. 
1053, 1060 (M.D. Fla. 1977), ajf'd sub nom. EA Shipping Co. v. Bazemore, 617 
F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200, 
1205 (D.N.H. 1974); United States v. One 1971 Porsche Coupe, 364 F. Supp. 745, 
747-48 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In United States v. One 1968 Ford LTD 4 Door, 425 F.2d 
1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1970), the Fifth Circuit applied an "active aid" test and up-
held the forfeiture of an automobile that was driven in the company of a second 
vehicle containing untaxed liquor. 
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however, results in a determination that the use "facilitated" the CDS 
violation. Thus, using a vehicle to commute to the scene of the transac-
tion is usually not considered a significant enough connection to facili-
tate the transaction,77 although some courts have reached an opposite 
conclusion.78 In this regard, money, coin, and currency may be distin-
guishable from automobiles; it is difficult to conceive of a situation 
where money with any connection to a CDS violation would not facili-
tate the violation as well. As a result, concern over this difference in 
terminology in subsections 297(a)(6) and (a)(8) may thus be of only 
academic interest. 
Subsection (6) provides that money, coin, and currency seized for 
forfeiture can only be returned to a claimant in accordance with the 
statutory procedures of section 297.79 The statute requires that the seiz-
ing authority institute a forfeiture proceeding against the seized money, 
coin, or currency within ninety days from the date of final disposition 
of the underlying criminal proceeding. 80 If the forfeiture is not insti-
tuted within this time period, the defendant may petition for return of 
the money, coin, or currency,s 1 and is entitled to its return.82 The statu-
tory provisions prevent a claimant from instituting an action in re-
plevin to recover the seized property.83 
Subsection (6) also provides that title to seized money, coin, or 
currency vests "immediately" in the seizing authority.84 The statute 
does not, however, specify whether immediately refers to the time of 
the violation, the seizure, or the institution of forfeiture proceedings. 
Analogous Maryland provisions allowing forfeiture of currency used in 
77. United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado, 575 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1978); How-
ard v. United States, 423 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1970) (decided under previous nar-
cotics forfeiture statute); United States v. Lane Motor Co., 199 F.2d 495 (lOth 
Cir. 1952) (tax forfeiture), affd, 344 U.S. 630 (1953); United States v. One Ford 
Coach, 1949 Model, 184 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1950) (tax forfeiture); Platt v. United 
States, 163 F.2d 165 (lOth Cir. 1947) (decided under previous narcotics forfeiture 
statute); United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974) (nar-
cotics forfeiture); United States v. One 1952 Ford Victoria, 114 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. 
Cal. 1953) (decided under previous narcotics forfeiture statute). 
78. United States v. One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4) permitted when automobile used to trans-
port drug dealer to site of transaction); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldo-
rado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977) (forfeiture under § 88l(a)(4) decreed 
when vehicle instrumental in transporting conspirators to location of conspiracy). 
79. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1982 & Supp. 1983). 
80. Jd § 297(b)(2) (Supp. 1983); see also Bozman v. Office of Fin., 296 Md. 492, 463 
A.2d 832 (1983) (when no criminal proceeding is commenced, 90 day limit does 
not apply). 
81. Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 297(b)(3) (Supp. 1983). The petition must be filed 
within one year of the disposition of the criminal proceeding. /d 
82. Office of Fin. v. Jones, 46 Md. App. 419, 417 A.2d 470, cert. denied, 288 Md. 740 
(1980). 
83. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(c) (1982). 
84. Jd § 297(a)(6) (Supp. 1983). 
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violation of gambling laws85 suggest that the state's title to money, coin, 
or currency connected with narcotics activity vests immediately upon 
seizure of the property. The gambling provision contains language 
identical to that in subsection (6).86 The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has concluded that the language in the gambling forfeiture statute that 
title to seized money "shall vest immediately" in the seizing authority 
refers to the moment that the money is seized, and not to the time the 
money is used in violation of law or at the time of judgment in the 
forfeiture proceeding. 87 Because the forfeiture provisions of subsection 
(6) and the gambling provision govern the seizure of currency and 
money, and because the provisions contain identical language, subsec-
tion (6) should be construed to vest the title in the seizing authority 
upon seizure of the money, coin, or currency.88 
The time at which the government's title vests is significant in de-
termining the rights of transferees of property. Most federal courts 
have concluded that the government's title to forfeitable property vests 
at the time the property is used in violation of law, and not at the time 
of seizure or the time of judgment in the civil forfeiture proceeding. 89 
85. /d. § 264 (1982 & Supp. 1983). 
86. /d. § 264(a). The gambling provision states in pertinent part: 
Whenever any money, currency, or cash is seized or captured by any 
police officer in this State in connection with any arrest for the playing or 
operation of any bookmaking, betting and wagering on horses or athletic 
events, or any lottery, game, table, or gaming device unlawful under the 
provisions of this article, all such money, currency, or cash shall be 
deemed prima facie to be contraband of law as a gambling device or as a 
part of a gambling operation. All rights, title, and interest in and to such 
money, currency, or cash seized by the police tifthe local government shall 
immediately vest in and to the local governments o/ the county, municipal-
ity, or Baltimore City, or !f seized by State authorities, to the State, and no 
such money, currency, or cash shall he returned to any person claiming the 
same, or to any other person, except as provided in this section. The Balti-
more City police department is not a State authority for the purposes of 
this section. 
/d. (emphasis supplied). 
87. As the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently explained: 
Because it is within the power of the legislature to determine when the 
transfer of rights to seized goods takes place, . . . the Maryland legisla-
ture has fixed the point at the moment the seizure occurs. At this time 
the money is prima facie contraband and belongs to the jurisdiction 
whose authorities consummate the seizure. 
Director of Fin. v. Cole, 296 Md. 607, 623, 465 A.2d 450, 459 (1983). 
88. q: Bozman v. Office of Fin., 296 Md. 492, 505-06, 463 A.2d 832, 839 (1983) (El-
dridge, J. dissenting) (reviewing legislative history of subsection (6)); Jones v. 
State, 56 Md. App. 101, 116, 466 A.2d 895, 903 (1983) ("Maryland's forfeiture 
statute does not permit the federal concept of 'automatic forfeiture' upon illegal 
activity."). 
89. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. I, 16-17 (1890); Thacher's Distilled Spirits, 103 
U.S. 679 (1880); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 362 (1842); United 
States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1982); Simons v. United States, 541 
F.2d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. O'Reilly, 486 F.2d 208, 210 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043 (1973); see Ca1ero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 685 (1974) (recognizing rule). 
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For example, under this "automatic forfeiture" rule, a vehicle used to 
transport drugs is technically the property of the state from the moment 
of its illegal use. The forfeiture proceeding merely perfects the govern-
ment's interest in the property. The automatic forfeiture rule can de-
feat the title of subsequent purchasers of the property since the original 
owner, deprived of legal title by his unlawful conduct, cannot convey 
good title.90 The automatic forfeiture rule, however, should not be ap-
plied to the forfeiture of money, coin, or currency, since there is a 
strong interest in the free transferability of legal tender. 
In sum, both the nature of the property covered by subsection (6) 
and the similarity of the subsection with the gambling forfeiture provi-
sion suggest that the seizing authority's title to seized money, coin, or 
currency vests at the time it is seized. 
2. Subsection (8): Everything of Value, Proceeds, Negotiable 
Instruments, and Securities 
The 1982 amendments to section 297(a) added a new subsection 
(8) that includes three additional categories of forfeitable property: (1) 
everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange 
for CDS; (2) all proceeds traceable to the exchange; and (3) negotiable 
instruments and securities used, or intended to be used, to facilitate any 
violation of section 297.91 
a. Everything of Value 
In the vast majority of drug transactions, controlled dangerous 
substances are exchanged for money. The "everything of value" provi-
sion covers not only money but anything else given in exchange.92 
Thus, a boat given in exchange for CDS can now be seized and for-
feited although it was never used to convey or facilitate the conveyance 
of CDS. In addition, anything "intended" to be furnished in exchange 
for CDS is subject to forfeiture. This provision is necessary because 
many transactions are interrupted by police action before the exchange 
actually takes place. Thus, while it may be more difficult to prove that 
property was intended to be furnished in exchange when no such ex-
change occurs, if the evidence establishes such an intention the prop-
erty can be forfeited. 
90. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890). 
91. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (Supp. 1983). For the text of this provision, 
see supra note 67. Several jurisdictions have recently adopted provisions similar 
to subsection 297(a)(8). D.C. CooE § 33-552 (Supp. 1983); HAWAll REv. STAT. 
§ 329-55 (Supp. 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 32-1550 (West Supp. 1984); MONT. 
CoDE ANN.§ 44-12-102 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 58-37-13 (Supp. 1983); WYO. 
STAT. § 35-7-1049 (Supp. 1983). 
92. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (Supp. 1983). Subsection (8) would cover, for 
example, precious metals such as gold, if it had been given in exchange for CDS. 
If the seller purchased the gold with the proceeds of a CDS transaction, the gold 
would be forfeitable proceeds. 
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b. Proceeds 
The new subsection (8) provides that proceeds traceable to an ex-
change of CDS are forfeitable. 9 3 While not defined in section 297, pro-
ceeds is a commonly used legal term meaning the status that attaches to 
any property that is substituted for what was originally exchanged.94 
For example, if a seller transfers CDS to a buyer in exchange for 
$100,000 in currency, the currency represents the proceeds of the CDS 
transaction. If the seller deposits the $100,000 in a bank account, 
$100,000 of his account becomes proceeds. If he withdraws $40,000 
and purchases an automobile, the automobile as well as the remaining 
$60,000 in the account are proceeds. Of course, the further the pro-
ceeds are removed from the CDS transaction, the more difficult it be-
comes to show that they are proceeds from the transaction. 
There is virtually no guidance in existing decisional law for deter-
mining what constitutes the proceeds traceable to an exchange of 
CDS.95 Reference to analogous areas of law may provide guidance, 
however, in tracing the proceeds of a narcotics transaction. The object 
of both the federal and Maryland drug forfeiture statutes is to allow 
seizure and forfeiture of both profits and assets of CDS trafficking, and 
to assure that the owner does not profit from the narcotics offense.96 
The law of restitution serves a similar object: to attempt to make a 
wrongdoer forfeit everything gained from his wrongful activities.97 
Since the same principles that apply to the forfeiture of proceeds of a 
CDS transaction apply to restitution, the Restatement of Restitution 
may serve as a useful guide in this area.9s 
The law of restitution clearly establishes that profits earned on 
93. Id. 
94. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1978); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1084 (5th ed. 1979). 
95. United States v. $364,960 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981), 
one of the few decisions construing the proceeds provisions of 21 U .S.C. § 881, is 
not technically a proceeds case. While there can be little doubt that the cash 
found in the apartment in that case was the proceeds of narcotics activity, this was 
not an instance where money given in exchange for CDS was traced through bank 
accounts and other property such as automobiles and real estate. Rather, the 
presence of small amounts of CDS, and the nationality and financial condition of 
the persons in possession was sufficient, in the Fifth Circuit's opinion, to show a 
substantial connection with CDS activity. 
96. While there is no record, as there is in Congress, of the legislative intent of the 
Maryland General Assembly that passed Senate Bill 83, the legislative history file 
contains numerous references suggesting that the purpose of S. 83 is to attack the 
profits of drug trafficking. Hearings on S. 83, supra note 3 (testimony of Harry L. 
Meyers, Assistant Chief Counsel, DEA, Jan. 26, 1982). As to the federal provi-
sion, Senator John Culver (D-Iowa) stated in sponsoring the amendment to 21 
U.S.C. § 881 that later became subsection 88l(a)(6): "The amendment that I am 
offering today would provide the United States with strong new weapons to ... 
strike at the profits of illegal drug trafficking." 124 CoNG. REc. 17644 (1970) 
(statement of Sen. Culver). 
97. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 215 (1937). 
98. Id. § 295; see Wade, The Literature of the Law of Restitution, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 
1087 (1968). 
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proceeds are also proceeds.99 Restitution law also supplies guidance in 
determining the rights of transferees of the proceeds. If the trafficker 
uses his proceeds to satisfy a lawful debt, the proceeds should not be 
seizable when possessed by the transferees. 100 If an asset that is pro-
ceeds is collateral for a debt, such as a residential mortgage, law en-
forcement authorities can proceed against the asset. In non-debt 
situations, ifthe transferee is a bona fide purchaser for value, law en-
forcement authorities should be estopped from forfeiting the proceeds 
in the possession of the bona fide purchaser.I01 Indeed, subsection (8) 
gives an owner of property or proceeds an opportunity to prevent for-
feiture by establishing that the basis for the forfeiture occurred without 
the owner's knowledge or consent. 102 The justification for this ration-
ale is clear: the purpose of tracing proceeds is to punish the trafficker, 
not an innocent third party. 103 
In addition to profits, assets acquired by the trafficker in exchange 
for proceeds become proceeds themselves and are subject to forfeiture. 
The proceeds, however, must be traced to specific assets. 104 In a forfei-
ture case, unlike a tax proceeding, 105 it is not sufficient to show that the 
trafficker has assets, the source of which cannot be identified. For pro-
ceeds of CDS transactions to be forfeited, the government must iden-
tify the specific assets from which the proceeds are derived. 106 Thus, if 
the trail disappears, the right of forfeiture disappears with it. 
c. Negotiable Instruments and Securities 
The last part of subsection (8) provides for the forfeiture of "all 
negotiable instruments and securities used, or intended to be used, to 
99. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 205 (1937). 
100. See id. § 207. 
101. See id. § 172. 
102. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (Supp. 1983). 
103. The federal rule providing for automatic forfeiture at the time of the violation 
would, in some circumstances, penalize a bona fide purchaser who obtained the 
property before the conclusion of the forfeiture. See supra notes 89-90 and ac-
companying text (discussing automatic forfeiture). A statute providing that title 
vests in the government at the time of seizure, however, would tend to protect the 
interests of the bona fide purchaser. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text 
(discussing Maryland provision). 
104. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 215 (1937). 
105. See United States v. Massei, 355 U.S. 595 (1958); United States v. Grasso, 629 
F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). 
106. The forfeiture statutes require that the government prove that the proceeds are 
traceable to a CDS exchange. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (1982); Mo. ANN. ConE 
art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (Supp. 1983). In a criminal net worth tax prosecution, the 
government must show only an increase in net worth and either a "likely source" 
or the negation of all nontaxable sources of income. United States v. Grasso, 629 
F.2d 805, 807-08 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The tracing required for the forfei-
ture of proceeds of CDS violations accords with the law governing identification 
of trust property or the proceeds thereof. See Levin v. Security Fin. Ins. Corp., 
246 Md. 712, 230 A.2d 93 (1967). 
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facilitate any violation of this subheading." 107 This provision differs 
from the first two provisions in subsection (8) because it focuses on 
property used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of the 
CDS laws. In contrast, the first two provisions ("everything of value" 
and "proceeds") are limited to transactions or sales. Forfeiture of these 
categories requires proof that the property was furnished or was in-
tended to be furnished in exchange for CDS. 108 The negotiable instru-
ments provision is therefore broader since any negotiable instrument or 
security used to facilitate any violation of the CDS laws can be for-
feited. The word "facilitate" has been extensively discussed in many 
federal cases dealing with the forfeiture of conveyances and has been 
interpreted as having the ordinary dictionary meaning of making easier 
or less difficult. 109 
Nearly every use of negotiable instruments and securities by a 
drug trafficking organization facilitates the purpose of the organization, 
which is to sell drugs and realize profit. In contrast to the treatment of 
"money, coin, or currency" in subsection (6), the mere proximity of 
negotiable instruments and securities to CDS will not raise a presump-
tion that the property is forfeitable. For example, if during a drug raid 
stocks and bonds are found lying on a table next to CDS and drug 
paraphernalia, probable cause to believe they have been used to facili-
tate a CDS violation must be shown before they can be seized and 
forfeited. 110 
IV. SEIZURE OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE 
UNDER ARTICLE 27, SECTION 297 
The purpose of the discussion above was to review the recent 
changes to section 297. Although the 1982 amendments added several 
new categories of forfeitable property, the amendments did not affect 
many of the categories of property which could already be forfeited. 
Accordingly, the discussion below will first discuss the categories of 
property forfeitable under section 297, as well as the procedures for 
seizing each type of property. After reviewing the fourth amendment 
limitations upon forfeiture, this analysis concludes that compliance 
107. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (Supp. 1983). 
108. Id 
109. Compare, e.g., United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424 (lith Cir. 
1983) (vehicle facilitated CDS violation) and United States v. One 1974 Cadillac 
Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977) (same) with United States v. One 
1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026 (lst Cir. 1980) (use of the conveyance did 
not facilitate CDS violation) and Howard v. United States, 423 F.2d 1102 (9th 
Cir. 1970) (use of property did not facilitate CDS violation). See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 88l(a)(4) (1982) (facilitation as a basis for forfeiture of conveyances); BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY 531 (5th ed. 1979) (defining facilitate). 
110. In addition, probable cause is necessary for a seizure alone. See infra text at notes 
205-36 (discussing subsection (b) of section 297). It is doubtful, however, whether 
any law enforcement officer would fail to seize stocks found next to CDS and drug 
paraphernalia in the middle of a laboratory. 
1984) Forfeitures in Narcotics Cases 97 
with the fourth amendment requires the issuance of a seizure warrant 
prior to the seizure of certain types of forfeitable property. Following 
this discussion is an analysis of the remedy for fourth amendment vio-
lations when illegal forfeiture seizures occur. An examination of the 
exclusionary rule will show that although it may provide an effective 
remedy when illegally seized property is sought to be introduced in the 
criminal trial of the property owner, the rule's application to a forfei-
ture proceeding does not protect the owner of illegally seized property. 
The analysis concludes that the only effective remedy for an illegal 
seizure of property for forfeiture is the dismissal of the forfeiture 
action. 
A. Types of Property Subject to Foifeiture 
Since a forfeiture action is a civil proceeding in rem, the property 
must be seized and brought within the jurisdiction of the court before 
the forfeiture process can begin. 111 Property seizable under the Mary-
land provision falls into three categories: (1) movable property, such as 
conveyances; (2) immovable property, such as real estate; and (3) intan-
gible property, such as bank accounts. Movable property must be 
seized to create jurisdiction; 112 the owner of immovable property must 
be served with legal documents to create jurisdiction; intangible prop-
erty must be attached. 113 
Although property forfeitable under section 297 can be placed in 
one of these three categories, the forfeiture provision does not use these 
categories. Rather, the eight categories of property that can be for-
feited under subsection 297(a) are: (1) CDS; (2) raw materials, prod-
ucts, and equipment; (3) containers; (4) conveyances; (5) books, 
records, and research; (6) money, coin, or currency; (7) drug parapher-
nalia; and (8) everything of value, proceeds, negotiable instruments, 
and securities. 114 
Several categories of property rarely become the subject of litiga-
tion and thus warrant only brief mention. Seizures of CDS have not 
been the subject of litigation in forfeiture cases. 115 Schedule I Con-
Ill. The Brig Ann, l3 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289, 291 (1815); Prince George's County v. Blue 
Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 659, 284 A.2d 203, 205 (1971). 
112. See infra text at notes 205-36 (discussing fourth amendment and the procedure 
under section 297 for seizing property). 
113. Stocks and bonds can be considered movable property if they are documents that 
embody the obligation. Cf. Mo. CoMM. LAw CoDE ANN.§§ 8-101 to -406 (1975) 
(governing investment securities). If these documents do not exist, however, the 
representation of the obligation, such as a bank account, must be frozen. 
114. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a) (Supp. 1983). 
115. A claimant will object if the property is also going to be used as evidence in a 
criminal proceeding, but he will make the objection during the criminal proceed-
ing, not in the civil forfeiture proceeding. Cases that consider the basis for a 
seizure for forfeiture must be carefully segregated into two categories: (I) those in 
which the defendant challenges the evidence in a criminal case on the ground that 
it was discovered as a result of an illegal seizure for forfeiture; and (2) those in 
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trolled Dangerous Substances 116 are summarily forfeited to the state 
under subsection 297(e). 117 Although this provision does not explain 
what the seizing authority must show to forfeit Schedule I CDS, 118 no 
formal procedure is required since Schedule I lists those drugs for 
which there is no legitimate use and therefore no legal basis for 
possession. 119 
Similarly, few challenges are made to seizure of three other types 
of property in subsection 297(a): raw materials, products, and equip-
ment,120 containers, 121 and books, records, and research. 122 Drug en-
trepreneurs are understandably hesitant to raise questions in civil 
forfeiture proceedings over the seizure of their laboratories and busi-
ness records. 123 In addition, the seizure of immovables and intangibles 
such as real estate and bank accounts deserve little comment since the 
procedures for attaching these assets are well established. 124 
Challenges to the seizure of forfeitable property will occur most 
frequently in cases involving the seizure of conveyances, 125 the seizure 
of money, coin, or currency, 126 and the seizure of property forfeitable 
under subsection (a)(8). 127 When this property is located in an area in 
which its owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy, law enforce-
ment agents must obtain a search warrant to search for and seize the 
property. 128 When the property is not located in an area in which the 
which the claimant contests the forfeiture action on the ground that the seizure 
was illegal. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. 
116. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 279(a) (1982 & Supp. 1983). Among the drugs listed in 
Schedule I are heroin, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and marijuana. 
117. Subsection 297(e) provides: 
(e) Seizure and summary foifeiture o/ contraband. All substances listed 
in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, sold or offered for sale in 
violation of the provisions of this subheading shall be deemed contra-
band and seized and summarily forfeited to the State. Similarly, all sub-
stances listed in Schedule I, which are seized or come into possession of 
the State, the owners of which are unknown, shall be deemed contra-
band and summarily forfeited to the State. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(e) (1982). 
118. Id § 279(a) (1982 & Supp. 1983). 
119. "Contraband per se, of course, requires no proceeding for forfeiture." Director of 
Fin. v. Cole, 296 Md. 607, 619, 465 A.2d 450, 457 (1983). Although subsection 
297(e), by limiting itself to Schedule I drugs, implies that forfeitures of Schedule 
II, Ill, IV, and V CDS require more than summary forfeiture, formal proceedings 
are rarely followed to forfeit them. Once seized, CDS of any type is usually de-
stroyed by the state. 
120. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(2) (Supp. 1983). 
121. Id § 297(a)(3). 
122. Id § 297(a)(5). 
123. They will, of course, object if the property will be used as evidence in a criminal 
proceeding. 
124. Mo. R.P. 622, 623, Fl-F6, G40-G61 (1977 & Supp. 1983). For current versions, 
see Mo. R.P. 2-115, 2-126(f), 2-621, 2-641, 2-642, 2-643, 2-645, 2-646. 
125. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(4) (Supp. 1983). 
126. Id § 297(a)(6). 
127. Id § 297(a)(8). 
128. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In discussing the federal narcotics 
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owner has an expectation of privacy, the question then becomes 
whether a seizure warrant of some type is required to seize property for 
forfeiture. 
B. The Fourth Amendment and Seizures of Property Subject to 
Forfeiture 
The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.I29 
Although the fourth amendment applies to seizures for forfei-
ture, 130 courts disagree as to the precise application of this constitu-
tional provision. For example, courts are divided as to whether the 
fourth amendment warrant requirement is applicable to forfeiture 
seizures, whether an exception to that requirement excuses the failure 
to obtain a warrant, and if a constitutional violation occurs, what sanc-
tions a court may impose.IJI 
The following discussion will demonstrate that the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement should apply to certain seizures for forfei-
ture, that the application of the exclusionary rule, originally created to 
protect fourth amendment rights in criminal cases, 132 provides inade-
quate protection in forfeiture cases, and that denial of the forfeiture 
may be an appropriate remedy when a fourth amendment violation 
occurs. 
1. The Warrant Requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has stated that "searches [made] without prior 
approval by a judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the 
fourth amendment subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions." 133 Thus, probable cause and a warrant are 
forfeiture provision, the Fourth Circuit recently stated: "[t]he statute does not pur-
port to authorize an intrusion on a 'legitimate expectation of privacy,' which is 
now the focal point of Fourth Amendment protection." United States v. Kemp, 
690 F.2d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 
(1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)). 
129. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV (emphasis supplied). 
130. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696-98 (1965). 
131. See i'!fra notes 167 & 185 and accompanying text. 
132. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
133. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). The Court has 
recognized that a warrant is not required in certain circumstances. E.g., United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (mobile vehicle); United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 554 (1980) (consent); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (emer-
gency); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory of vehicle); 
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required to search a place in which a person has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacyP4 A warrant will be excused, however, in situations 
involving hot pursuit, 135 mobile vehicles, 136 destruction of evidence, 137 
or other exigent circumstances.l3s 
The application of the fourth amendment warrant requirement to 
seizures of property subject to forfeiture has not been analyzed by 
either the Supreme Court or Maryland's appellate courts. 139 Lower 
federal courts, however, have grappled with this question. 140 Several 
factors may explain why the question is seldom raised as to whether a 
warrant or some exception to the warrant requirement is required to 
seize forfeitable property. First, the statutes involved in forfeiture ac-
tions have not required a warrant and have in fact implied that none is 
needed. 141 Second, most decisions have focused on the forfeiture 
claim, determining whether the property was used illegally, 142 rather 
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (hot pursuit of arrestee); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 
(1973) (highly evanescent evidence); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) 
(search incident to lawful arrest); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) 
(abandonment); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (abandonment). As to 
the Court's preference for warrants, see Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 
(1981) (search warrant in addition to an arrest warrant needed to arrest a suspect 
in the house of a third person). 
134. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment. But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citations omitted). 
135. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 
(1967). 
136. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925). 
137. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). 
138. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (emergency); United States v. Gardner, 
627 F.2d 906, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1980) (exigent circumstances justify protective 
search of residence when officers reasonably believe that dangerous persons are 
within); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.) (report of unconscious 
woman provided sufficient exigency for forcible entry without a search warrant), 
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). For a list of other search warrant exceptions, see 
supra note 133. 
139. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 n.14 
(1974) ("We have no occasion to address the question whether the Fourth 
Amendment warrant or probable cause requirements are applicable to seizures 
under the Puerto Rican statutes"). The Puerto Rican statutes referred to by the 
Court are identical for the purposes of this discussion to both the federal and 
Maryland provisions. See21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982); Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297 
(1982 & Supp. 1983). 
140. E.g., United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967); United 
States v. McMichael, 541 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1982). 
141. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. 
142. See, e.g., United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424 (lith Cir. 
1983); United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 
u.s. 907 (1976). 
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than analyzing whether the warrantless seizure was proper. 143 Third, 
most seizures have occurred contemporaneously with an arrest and a 
patent violation of the CDS laws, thereby obviating the need for a 
search warrant. 
An explanation of the typical sequence of events giving rise to a 
forfeiture proceeding may be helpful in understanding the decisions 
discussing whether a warrant is required to seize property for forfei-
ture. Generally, the forfeitable property is in some manner used in vio-
lation of law. Depending upon the circumstances, the seizure of the 
property can occur during or subsequent to the violation. For example, 
the search of an automobile might reveal further evidence of a narcot-
ics violation. Typically, a criminal prosecution of the owner of the 
seized property will follow the seizure, although the prosecution is not 
a prerequisite to forfeiture. During the pendency of the criminal trial, 
the government will usually retain possession of the seized property for 
use as evidence. Finally, the government will institute a forfeiture pro-
ceeding to establish its right to retain permanently the seized property. 
Cases that have considered whether the fourth amendment re-
quires a warrant for seizures of property for forfeiture can be divided 
into two categories. The first category consists of criminal cases in 
which the admission of evidence is challenged on the ground that it was 
found as a result of an illegal forfeiture seizure. 144 The second group 
consists of forfeiture cases in which the forfeiture itself is challenged on 
the ground that the seizure was illegal. 145 While the second category 
deals solely with a forfeiture question, the first category involves a clas-
sic search and seizure question, complicated somewhat by the involve-
ment of a forfeiture seizure. The inconsistent results reached by the 
courts may be attributable to their failure to understand the difference 
between a search and seizure problem in a criminal case and a seizure 
in a civil forfeiture case. 
2. The Warrant Requirement and Forfeiture Seizures: Challenges in 
Criminal Cases to the Admission of Evidence Found as a 
Result of a Warrantless Forfeiture Seizure 
Most cases that discuss whether a forfeiture seizure must meet the 
fourth amendment warrant requirements have involved challenges in 
criminal cases to the admissibility of evidence found as a result of a 
warrantless seizure for forfeiture. Typically, the defendant argues that 
the failure to obtain a warrant prior to the forfeiture seizure violated 
the fourth amendment and that evidence found as a result of the 
seizure must be suppressed at the criminal trial. Most courts have held, 
for various reasons, that a warrant is not required to seize property for 
143. See, e.g., State v. One 1979 Pontiac Firebird, 55 Md. App. 394, 462 A.2d 73 
(1983); Crowley v. State, 25 Md. App. 417, 334 A.2d 557 (1975). 
144. See infra notes 146-89 and accompanying text. 
145. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. 
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forfeiture. 146 A minority of courts, however, have held that a warrant 
or some exception to the warrant requirement is needed. 147 
Courts have used several theories to support the conclusion that 
the fourth amendment does not require a warrant to seize property for 
forfeiture. The first theory relies on the concept that the government is 
entitled to the property subject to the forfeiture from the moment of its 
unlawful use. 148 This theory is derived from language in Boyd v. 
United States, 149 an 1886 Supreme Court decision. The Boyd Court 
stated: 
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or 
goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment 
thereof, are totally different things from a search for and 
seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of 
obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as 
evidence against him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the 
one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the 
property; in the other, it is not. 150 
The Court buttressed its position by indicating that the First Congress 
passed both the customs statutes and the Bill of Rights. 151 Therefore, 
the Court reasoned that the First Congress did not regard searches and 
seizures of this kind as unreasonable, within the prohibition of the 
fourth amendment.Js2 
Subsequent lower court decisions have adopted this rationale, re-
ferred to as the automatic forfeiture rule. 153 Although this concept is 
useful in dealing with claims of bona fide purchasers, it ignores the 
146. E.g., United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. One 
1975 Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); Francolino v. United States, 
367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967). 
147. E.g., United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1468-76 (9th Cir. 1983); United States 
v. Karp, 508 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (1914),cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); United 
States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Whitlock, 418 
F. Supp. 138, 141-42 (E.D. Mich. 1976), affd mem., 556 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1977). 
148. The inception of the government's property right "occurs when the car is illegally 
used. The physical repossession of the automobile may occur subsequently." 
United States v. One 1952 Ford Victoria, 114 F. Supp. 458, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1953). 
149. 116 u.s. 616 (1886). 
150. Id. at 623. 
151. Id. In a recent decision the Court again used this reasoning to support its conclu-
sion that another customs statute, 19 U.S.C. § 158l(a) (1976), authorized the sus-
picionless boarding of vessels by government officers. United States v. 
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2578 (1983) (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623). 
For a discussion of the Villamonte-Marquez decision, see Note, Constitutional 
Law-Search and Seizure-19 U.S.C 158J(a). Random and Suspicionless Boarding 
of Vessel by Customs Officers does not Violate the Fourth Amendment's Prohibition 
Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 159 (1984). 
152. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. 
153. See, e.g., United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 
1958); United States v. One Pontiac LeMans, 470 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Mass. 1979), 
ajjd, 621 F.2d 444 (lst Cir. 1980); Fell v. Armour, 355 F. Supp. 1319 (M.D. Tenn. 
1972). 
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fourth amendment right of the property's owner or possessor to be free 
from unreasonable seizures. The fourth amendment "protects two 
types of expectations, one involving 'searches,' the other 'seizures'. . . . 
A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interfer-
ence with an individual's possessory interests in that property." 154 A 
determination, without more, that the government has a superior inter-
est in the property is insufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the 
seizure. The fourth amendment, which governs the manner of seizure, 
must be satisfied. 155 
Courts have adopted a second theory that recognizes a further ex-
ception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement when seizures of 
property for forfeiture are involved. In United States v. Francolino, 156 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the 
introduction in a criminal case of evidence found as a result of a search 
of a vehicle seized for forfeiture without a warrant under 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 781-84. 157 The Francolino court, relying on Boyd and Carroll v. 
United States, 158 reasoned that Congress could, consistently with the 
fourth amendment, create a further exception to the search warrant re-
quirement for vehicles that have transported contraband. 159 
The court's rationale in Francolino presents several problems. 
First, the Second Circuit created a new exception to the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement, something which the Supreme Court has 
not yet approved. 160 Second, reliance on Boyd is weak since the sup-
portive language is dictum. 161 Third, Carroll dealt with the warrantless 
search of a vehicle, not its warrantless seizure. The fourth amendment 
interests implicated in searches and seizures differ: while searches inter-
fere with privacy interests, 162 seizures interfere with possessory inter-
154. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984). 
155. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). InJejfers, government officials 
seized untaxed drugs after a warrantless search of a hotel room. The Court specif-
ically rejected the argument that officials could search for and seize the drugs 
because of their contraband nature, holding that the right to forfeit drugs did not 
abrogate the fourth amendment. As to the idea that "forfeit is forfeit," no matter 
how far prior to the seizure the unlawful use occurred, see the majority and dis-
senting opinions in the recent Fourth Circuit case of United States v. Kemp, 690 
F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1982). The majority specifically declined to discuss the fourth 
amendment question: "We express no opinion on whether exigent circumstances 
are necessary, or were present in the case at bar, to sustain this seizure pursuant to 
[the federal statutes] under the Fourth Amendment." Id at 402. The Kemp court 
remanded the case to the district court for consideration of this issue. See also 
Jones v. State, 56 Md. App. 101, 466 A.2d 895 (1983) (following Kemp). 
156. 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967). 
157. 49 u.s.c. § 782 (1976). 
158. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
159. Franco/ino, 367 F.2d at 1022. 
160. Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974). 
161. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (court did not determine whether 
warrantless seizure for forfeiture was unconstitutional). 
162. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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ests. 163 The Carroll rationale clearly does not justify the often 
permanent interference with a person's possessory interests, without 
prior judicial approval, that results from a warrantless forfeiture 
seizure. Fourth, the Franco/ino court's statement that "we cannot recall 
too often that the Fourth Amendment bans only unreasonable searches 
and seizures," 164 cannot be considered accurate in light of the language 
in Katz v. United States .165 The Katz Court remarked that "the most 
basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches' conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a 
few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." 166 A blan-
ket forfeiture exception to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with 
the mandate of Katz since many instances of seizures of property for 
forfeiture are planned well in advance and while there is time to secure 
a seizure warrant. 
Despite these problems, Francolino remains the majority opinion 
on warrantless seizures of property for forfeiture and has been followed 
in a number of circuits. 167 As additional support for this position, other 
courts have cited warrantless arrests of persons in public places 168 and 
the inapplicability of fourth amendment warrant requirements to a 
civil in rem forfeiture action. 169 Some courts have also attempted to 
justify warrantless forfeiture seizures by reasoning that the fourth 
amendment standards applicable to seizures are less stringent than 
those applied to searches. 170 The Supreme Court has never directly 
163. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984). 
164. Franco/ino, 367 F.2d at 1022. 
165. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), quoted with approval in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443 (1971). 
166. Katz, 389 U.S. at 454-55; see supra notes 133-38. 
167. United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1975 
Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 444 (lst Cir. 1980); United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d 
717 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. White, 488 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Mills, 440 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stout, 434 F.2d 1264 
(lOth Cir. 1970); United States v. Troiano, 365 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
385 U.S. 958 (1966); Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699 (lOth Cir.), cert. 
denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963). In United States v. Pappas, 600 F.2d 300 (lst Cir.), 
aJrd on rehearing, 613 F.2d 324 (lst Cir. 1979), the First Circuit followed the 
Franco/ino approach. The latter Pappas opinion, however, can be interpreted as 
supporting the McCormick rationale. ld (probable cause exception to seizure of 
automobile, 21 U.S.C. 881 (1982), not applicable unless the seizure immediately 
followed violations); see infra note 185 (discussing Pappas). 
168. See United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981). 
169. See United States v. One Thousand Fifty-Eight Dollars in United States Cur-
rency, 323 F.2d 211, 213 (3d Cir. 1963). 
170. Compare United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 285 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[w]e 
start with the proposition that the Fourth Amendment applies equally to searches 
and to seizures") with United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 367, 369 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(finding a "distinction, for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, between 
searches and seizures"; court required less probable cause to support a forfeiture 
seizure than a search) and United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.) (stan-
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resolved the question, although a reading of Cardwell v. Lewis 171 indi-
cates that searches and seizures should be judged by the same criteria. 
The first case to challenge the Franco/ino rule was United States v. 
McCormick .172 In McCormick, the Ninth Circuit held that the war-
rantless seizure for forfeiture of an automobile parked in the defend-
ant's driveway violated the fourth amendment. Since the court 
assumed that the fourth amendment applied equally to searches and 
seizures, those seizures conducted without a warrant were per se unrea-
sonable under the fourth amendment, 173 subject only to certain excep-
tions such as exigent circumstances. 174 The McCormick court reasoned 
that since Congress cannot authorize a search or seizure that violates 
the fourth amendment, 175 absent a recognized exception a law enforce-
ment official must first obtain a valid warrant before seizing a vehicle 
under a forfeiture statute. 176 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland in 
United States v. McMichae/ 177 recently followed McCormick. In Mc-
Michael, the court analyzed prior decisions and held that CDS found 
during a search of a vehicle seized for forfeiture could not be intro-
duced as evidence in McMichael's criminal trial since the warrantless 
seizure of the automobile violated the fourth amendment. 178 Although 
the vehicle had facilitated an earlier violation, it was not seized until 
fifteen hours after McMichael's arrest. Furthermore, the vehicle was 
not searched until two months after its seizure and the search was 
based on information supplied by a co-defendant that CDS might be 
found in the trunk. The search revealed tinfoil packets of cocaine. 179 
The McMichael court first found that subsection 88l(b)(l) of the 
federal statute, 180 which authorizes seizures for forfeiture made inci-
dent to a lawful arrest, did not support the seizure since it was not 
made until long after the defendant's arrest. 181 Turning to subsection 
(b)(4), the court acknowledged that it did not require a warrant, but 
rather only probable cause. 182 Nevertheless, applying the McCormick 
line of reasoning and rejecting Franco/ina, the court ruled that an "exi-
gent circumstances" requirement must be read into the statute "to 
dard of probable cause to suppport a seizure for forfeiture is less than that re-
quired to obtain a search warrant), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978). 
171. 417 u.s. 583 (1974). 
172. 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974). 
173. Id. at 285; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
174. McCormick, 502 F.2d at 285; see supra note 133 and text accompanying notes 135-
38. 
175. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2575, 2578 (1983); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). 
176. United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 285 (9th Cir. 1974). 
177. 541 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1982). 
178. Id. at 965. 
179. Id. at 957-60. 
180. 21 u.s.c. 88l(b)(l) (1982). 
181. McMichael, 541 F. Supp. at 960. 
182. Id. 
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avoid the serious constitutional question posed by a warrantless seizure 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Section 881(b)(4)." 183 Finding no exigent cir-
cumstances, the McMichael court ruled the seizure invalid. As a result, 
the investigatory search that followed was also defective. 184 
While a few courts have reached conclusions similar to McMi-
chael, 185 a majority of courts have continued to uphold warrantless 
seizures of property for forfeiture. 186 Most of these cases involve 
automobiles. Because the mobile vehicle exception to the warrant re-
quirement may excuse the necessity of obtaining a warrant, 187 many of 
these cases would be similarly decided regardless of the position 
adopted by the court. Problems arise, however, when the courts that 
follow Francolino are faced with warrantless seizures of property that 
do not involve an automobile or some clearly defined exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
When evidence is offered in a criminal case that has been found as 
a result of a warrantless seizure of property for forfeiture, courts should 
follow the McCormick rationale. Under McCormick, seizures of prop-
erty for forfeiture require a warrant or exigent circumstances that trig-
ger a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. 188 Absent a 
warrant or an exception, the exclusionary rule requires that evidence 
obtained as a result of the seizure be excluded from the criminal 
trial.1S9 
183. /d at 964. 
184. ld (citing United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 
907 (1978). 
185. United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1468-76 (9th Cir. 1983) (extending McCor-
mick to narcotics forfeitures); United States v. Pruett, 551 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 
1977) (suitcases found in automobile obtained by warrantless seizure inadmissible 
at owner's trial); United States v. Thrower, 442 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (up-
holding warrantless seizure of automobile as exception to warrant requirement 
because it was seized under exigent circumstances); State v. Manuel, 426 So. 2d 
140, 146 (La. 1983) ("The warrant safeguard is equally applicable to seizure of an 
automobile for the purposes of forfeiture, since the warrantless seizure of an auto-
mobile as contraband is subject to the same potential for abuse as the seizure of 
articles for evidentiary purposes without prior judicial approval."). In United 
States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 331 (lst Cir. 1979), the First Circuit held a war-
rantless seizure of an automobile a violation of the fourth amendment but never-
theless upheld the introduction into evidence in the criminal trial of a gun found 
in the vehicle. The Pappas court relied upon Michigan v. DeFilipo, 443 U.S. 31 
(1979), and noted that the exclusionary rule was an improper remedy when the 
seizure was not in violation of any prior judicial construction. 
186. See supra note 167 (listing cases). 
187. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). But see United States v. Spetz, 771 
F.2d 1457, 1470-73 (9th Cir. 1983) (automobile exception did not excuse warrant-
less seizure of vehicle when there was no probable cause to believe vehicle con-
tained contraband when seized, and when vehicle was parked two miles from 
owner's residence). 
188. United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974). 
189. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
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3. The Warrant Requirement and Forfeiture Seizures: Challenges 
to the Forfeiture of Property Seized Without a Warrant 
or an Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
Although most courts have concluded otherwise, 190 the seizure of 
property for forfeiture without a warrant or an exception violates the 
warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. When the seizure is 
challenged in the criminal trial of the property's owner, the exclusion-
ary rule provides adequate protection from fourth amendment viola-
tions by excluding any evidence found as a result of the illegal seizure. 
As explained below, however, the application of the exclusionary rule 
to a forfeiture proceeding itself does not protect against unconstitu-
tional seizures; dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding is the appropriate 
remedy. 
When a claimant in a forfeiture proceeding challenges the war-
rantless seizure of property for forfeiture, courts have almost unani-
mously rejected the argument that a seizure made in violation of the 
fourth amendment requires the dismissal of the forfeiture action. 191 
Courts reach this conclusion because of the manner in which they ap-
ply the exclusionary rule to forfeiture cases. The rule that excludes im-
properly seized evidence is effective in criminal cases since the 
defendant is objecting to the admissibility of the evidence against him, 
not the seizure or deprivation itself. Excluding the illegally seized evi-
dence cures the constitutional violation by nullifying the reason for 
which the evidence was seized, that is, to be used against the defendant 
in a criminal proceeding. In forfeiture cases, however, the purpose of 
the seizure is not to generate evidence against the property owner, but 
rather to take the property away from him. 192 
In forfeiture cases, the exclusionary rule, as in criminal cases, bars 
evidence that has been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. 
The evidence that supports a forfeiture, however, rarely comes from the 
seizure itself. 193 Instead, the evidence of criminal use usually derives 
190. United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1975 
Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d 
717 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. White, 488 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Mills, 440 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stout, 434 F.2d 1264 
(lOth Cir. 1970); United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967); United States v. Troiano, 365 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699 (lOth Cir.), 
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963). 
191. E.g., United States v. One 1977 Mercedes-Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Eighty-Eight Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars, 671 F.2d 293, 297 
(8th Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 
351, 352 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Director of Fin. v. Cole, 296 Md. 60't, 630 
n.6, 465 A.2d 450, 463 n.6 (1983); see generally Annot., 8 A.L.R. 3d 473 (1966 & 
Supp. 1983) (collecting cases). 
192. Of course, the seizure or a search of seized property could nevertheless generate 
evidence of the owner's criminal conduct. · 
193. An exception is One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). 
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from observations and admissions made prior to the seizure, such as 
when an automobile is seized because the defendant sold drugs from it 
on prior occasions. The evidence of illegal use, therefore, is independ-
ent of the seizure. The application of the exclusionary rule to forfeiture 
cases can result in the anomalous situation where the seizure itself may 
be constitutionally defective yet still be upheld because the evidence to 
support the forfeiture was constitutionally obtained. 194 
The application of the exclusionary rule to forfeiture cases, there-
fore, does not protect citizens from unconstitutional seizures of their 
property. The fourth amendment forbids unreasonable s~arches and 
seizures. The disparity in treatment occasioned by the application of 
the exclusionary rule to forfeiture cases is nowhere justified in the Con-
stitution. Indeed, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 195 the Supreme Court, 
in discussing administrative searches, specifically recognized that "[i]t 
is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property 
are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual 
is suspected of criminal behavior."196 
It is clear, therefore, that seizures of property intended for forfei-
ture should be treated the same as seizures of property intended as evi-
dence in criminal cases. Since the exclusionary rule is an ineffective 
guardian of constitutional rights in forfeiture proceedings, courts deal-
ing with forfeitures involving unconstitutional seizures of property 
should consider dismissal of the forfeiture proceedings as an appropri-
ate remedy. A few courts have taken this position. 197 
For example, in Berkowitz v. United States, 198 the court dismissed 
a forfeiture of currency as improper because the money had been 
In that case, illegal liquor was found as a result of an illegal seizure. Since the 
evidence was excluded, the forfeiture failed. 
194. E.g., United States v. One 1975 Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 444, 450 (1st Cir. 1980); 
United States v. One 1971 Harley Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351, 352 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); John Bacall Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 412 F.2d 586, 
588 (9th Cir. 1969); lnterbartolo v. United States, 303 F.2d 34, 39 (lst Cir. 1962). 
195. 387 u.s. 523 (1967). 
196. Id at 530 (footnote omitted). 
197. Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168 (lst Cir. 1965); United States v. Thirty-
Eight Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-Four Dollars in United States Currency, 
498 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (dismissing forfeiture), mod!fted sub nom. 
United States v. White, 660 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1981) (seizure held legal; conse-
quently no need to bar forfeiture), on remand, 541 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 
(underlying search illegal; forfeiture again dismissed), rev'd, 706 F.2d 806 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (forfeiture proceeded since search upheld); Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F. 
Supp. 1205, 1210 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 486 F.2d 1032 (1st Cir. 1973); In re 
1972 Porsche, 307 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See generally Note, 
Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Illegal Seizure of Derivative Contraband 
Bars Foifeiture, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 724 (1982) (advocating dismissal of forfeiture). 
A trial judge should also consider dismissal of a forfeiture as an appropriate rem-
edy for due process violations. See supra note 4. 
198. 340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965). 
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seized in violation of the owner's constitutional rights. 199 In Melendez 
v. Shultz,2oo a three judge federal district court panel held that the 
seizure by federal agents of an automobile in local police custody vio-
lated the fourth amendment. Specifically, the Melendez court reasoned 
that if a violation results in the suppression of evidence it should also 
result in the defeat of the forfeiture, stating that "[t]he initial seizure 
being unconstitutional, it would be 'attaching too· great a premium' 
upon such conduct to permit the government now to retain the 
vehicle. "20 1 
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful conduct 
and to preserve respect for government and judicial integrity,202 these 
purposes are more effectively fulfilled by a rule that not only excludes 
illegally obtained evidence from use in a forfeiture proceeding but also 
bars the forfeiture itself.203 Absent this rule, there is little to deter po-
lice officers from improperly seizing property for forfeiture, something 
they cannot do in criminal cases without the scrunity of a neutral and 
detached magistrate. Whether the property is seized as evidence in a 
criminal case or for forfeiture, the deprivation suffered by the property 
owner is the same. The Melendez court acknowledged this point in 
discussing the seizure of an automobile: "the right of the automobile 
owner not to have it searched is no more worthy of protection than his 
right not to have it seized without legal procedure."204 A rule barring 
the forfeiture of illegally seized property would have far less impact on 
the administration of justice than the exclusion of evidence in a crimi-
nal case. 
C Procedure for Seizing Property Subject to Forfeiture 
Having analyzed the fourth amendment considerations in relation 
to seizures of property for forfeiture, the following discussion will ex-
amine the procedures that govern seizure of property involved in CDS 
violations, with an emphasis on whether the statutory procedures are 
adequate in light of the fourth amendment warrant requirement. The 
199. /d. at 173. But see United States v. One 1975 Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 444, 450 
(1st Cir. 1980) (court questioned the Berkowitz rationale) (dictum). 
200. 356 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 486 F.2d 1032 (1st Cir. 1973). 
201. Melendez, 356 F. Supp. at 1210 (quoting Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168, 
174 (1st Cir. 1965)). 
202. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,486 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 466 
(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961). But if. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2340-44 (1984) (White, 
J., concurring) (questioning deterrent effect of exclusionary rule when law en-
forcement officers act in the reasonable belief that a search and seizure was consis-
tent with the fourth amendment). 
203. See United States v. Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1950) (barring 
forfeiture); if. State v. One 1980 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 55 Md. App. 178, 
185, 469 A.2d 487, 491 (1984) (dismissing forfeiture for failure to comply with 
statutory time constraints in Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297 (1982)). 
204. Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 486 
F.2d 1032 (1st Cir. 1973). 
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controlling Maryland provision, article 27, subsection 297(b), provides 
in part: 
Seizure of property subject to foifeiture .- Any property sub-
ject to forfeiture under this subheading may be seized upon 
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the prop-
erty except that seizure without such process may be made 
when---(i) The seizure is incident to an arrest or a search 
under a search warrant or an inspection under an administra-
tive inspection warrant; (ii) The property subject to seizure 
has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the State 
in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this 
subheading; (iii) There is probable cause to believe that the 
property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; 
or (iv) There is probable cause to believe that the property has 
been used or is intended to be used in violation of this 
subheading. 205 
Subsection 297(b), which closely parallels the language in the com-
parable federal provision,206 indicates that in the absence of the four 
enumerated exceptions, a court must issue some type of "process" 
before property may be seized for forfeiture. 207 The statute, however, 
provides no guidelines as to what criteria a court should consider in 
issuing this process, although probable cause to believe the property 
has been or is intended to be used illegally should undoubtedly be the 
test.zos 
205. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(b) (Supp. 1983). 
206. 21 u.s.c. § 88l(b) (1982). 
207. Exactly what "process" is required by the statute, however, is unclear. Process in 
relation to seizures of property is a recognized concept in admiralty law. The 
rules governing admiralty seizures provide for the issuance of a seizure warrant on 
the basis of a verified complaint, affidavit, and description of the property to be 
seized. 28 U.S.C. App. SUPP. ADM. & MARITIME R. B(l), C(l), C(2). Maryland 
law, however, lacks a procedural analogue. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 88l(b) (1982) 
("upon process issued pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty 
and Maritime Claims") with Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(b) (Supp. 1983) 
("upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the property"). Mary-
land procedural rules define process as "any written order issued by a court to 
secure compliance with its commands, or to require action by any person, includ-
ing but not limited to a summons at law or in equity, an order of publication, a 
commission, a writ and an order of any kind." Mo. R.P. 5, § y (1977) (current 
version at Mo. R.P. l-202(s)); see also id § ff (defining writ) (current version at 
Mo. R.P. l-202(y)). 
208. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a) (Supp. 1983) (forfeiture of each category of 
property requires evidence of some type of illegal use). This should be the test 
even though subsection 297(b) states that the existence of probable cause consti-
tutes an exception to the "process" requirement. q: United States v. McMichael, 
541 F. Supp. 956, 964 (D. Md. 1982) (imposing an exigent circumstances require-
ment on analogous federal statute to remedy constitutional infirmity of statute). 
The statutory exception, of course, does not dispense with the warrant require-
ment of the fourth amendment. q: United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. 
Ct. 2573, 2578 (1983) ("no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Con-
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Subsection 297(b) sets forth four exceptions to the process require-
ment.209 The second exception merits little discussion since a prior 
judgment for forfeiture means that a judge has already ruled that the 
property was used in violation of law and should be forfeited. Thus, 
this exception satisfies the fourth amendment preference for review by 
a neutral and detached magistrate. The manner of seizure, however, 
may remain a problem. Although a court has already rendered a judg-
ment for forfeiture, a seizure warrant may still be necessary to seize 
property for forfeiture. For example, the Supreme Court has indicated 
that an arrest warrant is insufficient by itself to seize a person in an-
other person's home.210 A search warrant for that home is also re-
quired. Applying this principle to forfeitures, it becomes apparent that 
a search warrant in addition to the judgment for forfeiture may be re-
quired to seize property located in another person's home or in an area 
where a third person has an expectation ofprivacy.211 The third excep-
tion, which applies when the property is dangerous to health or safety, 
poses few constitutional problems. If any CDS situation merits a 
seizure without a warrant, the emergency search exception to the war-
rant requirement will probably sustain such a seizure.212 
The first and the fourth exceptions enumerated in subsection 
297(b) are most frequently used as the basis for seizing property subject 
to forfeiture in narcotics cases.213 Specifically, seizures incident to an 
stitution") (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973)). 
A recent Fourth Circuit decision contains a useful discussion of whether probable 
cause can become stale in forfeiture cases. United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397 
(4th Cir. 1982). The Kemp court held that the probable cause requirement of 21 
U.S.C. § 88l(b)(4) does not require that the seizure be contemporaneous with the 
events giving rise to probable cause "if the property seized allegedly 'has been 
used' in violation of the drug laws." The court implied that probable cause in this 
situation could never become stale. Id at 400. The Kemp court expressed reser-
vations about situations where probable cause existed to believe the property was 
"intended" to be used unlawfully since "if the property is not so used, that would 
belie the original belief." Id at 401 n.4. 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland recently followed the Kemp 
court's reasoning, and held that the passage of time between the criminal conduct 
and a seizure was irrelevant to a determination of probable cause under article 27, 
§ 297, since the statute only required a showing that the property "has been used" 
in violation of CDS laws. Jones v. State, 56 Md. App. 101, 115, 466 A.2d 895, 903 
(1983). The Jones court, however, acknowledged that delays in seizure could cre-
ate due process problems. Id. at 117, 466 A.2d at 903. The court determined that 
the three month delay did not violate due process, and noted that a case-by-case 
analysis would be used in evaluating due process claims. Id at 117-18, 466 A.2d 
at 903. 
209. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(b)(l) (Supp. 1983) (reproduced supra text at note 
205). 
210. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
211. See United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1982). 
212. See United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1980); Wayne v. 
United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). 
213. E.g., Geppi v. State, 270 Md. 239, 310 A.2d 768 (1973) (seizure based upon prob-
able cause); Office of Fin. v. Jones, 46 Md. App. 419, 417 A.2d 470 (seizure of 
currency based upon probable cause), cert. denied, 288 Md. 740 (1980). 
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arrest and seizures made on probable cause to believe the property has 
been or is intended to be used unlawfully raise troublesome issues. 
1. Seizures Made Incident to Arrest 
This exception to the subsection 297(b) requirements provides that 
no process is necessary where the seizure for forfeiture is made "inci-
dent to an arrest." Thus, since no warrant is required, a police officer 
may arrest a person for possessing or selling CDS and seize any prop-
erty that has become subject to forfeiture as a result of that offense. 
Many arrests, however, are made long after the commission of the 
offense giving rise to the forfeiture.214 For example, during a conspir-
acy investigation, arrests may be postponed while law enforcement of-
ficers gather additional evidence. When a conspirator is subsequently 
arrested in a vehicle that has been used previously to transport CDS, a 
question arises as to whether the arrest of the conspirator provides the 
basis for a simultaneous seizure of property that, by virtue of an earlier 
offense, had become subject to forfeiture. Subsection 297(b)(l)(i) im-
plies that the arrest, in these circumstances, provides a basis for seizure. 
Examination of this common arrest situation, however, suggests that a 
warrant may be required. 
Most courts uphold the seizure of property subject to forfeiture as 
long as the seizure is made contemporaneously with an arrest. Despite 
this tendency, danger exists in relying on the language of subsection 
297(b). The phrase "incident to arrest" has a peculiar meaning in the 
law of search and seizure. In Chime/ v. Cal(fornia,215 the Supreme 
Court allowed an exception to the warrant requirement for searches 
incident to arrest because of the need to protect the officer's safety and 
to prevent the destruction of evidence.216 It is difficult to perceive how 
this rationale justifies the warrantless seizure of forfeitable property 
merely because of the contemporaneous arrest of its owner or posses-
sor. A court may therefore invalidate a seizure in this situation where 
the officer had time to obtain a warrant in advance. The court could 
easily distinguish a situation where an arrest and the grounds for 
seizure arise simultaneously from the situation where the arrest of a 
person and the seizure of his property was planned and was not the 
immediate result of a crime committed in the officer's presence. In 
sum, there is an exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth 
amendment in the first example because of the exigent circumstances, 
but no exception in the second situation because the officer had suffi-
214. For example, in United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974), the 
illegal use of the vehicle seized occurred prior to the owner's arrest. The vehicle 
was parked in the owner's driveway at the time the agents arrested the owner in 
his house. 
215. 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
216. Id at 764. 
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cient time to obtain a warrant.2•7 
2. Seizures Made Upon Probable Cause 
Failing to find support in the incident to arrest exception to the 
process requirements of subsection 297(b),218 an officer seizing property 
that is subject to forfeiture because of an earlier offense may still be 
able to rely on the fourth exception in subsection 297(b)(l). The fourth 
exception authorizes the warrantless seizure of property subject to for-
feiture when there is probable cause to believe that the property has 
been used or was intended to be used unlawfully.219 A literal reading 
of this exception would swallow the entire provision. Obviously the 
statutory drafters did not intend this result, and at least one federal 
court has been reluctant to give such an expansive interpretation to the 
federal counterpart of the Maryland statute.22o 
Maryland courts, though, have had few problems with this provi-
sion. Despite the statement by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Gatewood v. State 221 that "[i]t would serve no purpose to repeat the 
careful explication of the constitutional problems inherent in forfeiture 
statutes made for the Court by Judge Digges in [Prince George's County 
v.] Blue Bird [Cab Co.),"222 the question of whether a warrant or some 
exception to the warrant requirement is constitutionally necessary to 
seize property for forfeiture has never been extensively discussed by the 
Maryland courts. For example, in Geppi v. State,223 the court of ap-
peals decided whether the currency seized for forfeiture from the appel-
lant was pursuant to the "incident to arrest" or the "probable cause" 
provisions of subsection 297(b).224 Although it concluded that the 
seizure was not made incident to the appellant's arrest and thus sustain-
able under the first exception in subsection (b), the Geppi court found 
that the forfeiture proceeding was based on the fourth exception. The 
court indicated that there was probable cause to believe that the prop-
erty had been used or was intended to be used in violation of Maryland 
law.225 The question of whether this was sufficient under the fourth 
and fourteenth amendments was never discussed. 
217. See United States v. McMichael, 541 F. Supp. 956, 960 (D. Md. 1982) (warrant-
less seizure of automobile violated fourth amendment when there was ·~ust no 
good reason why the DEA agents could not ... have sought to obtain a warrant 
from a judicial officer"). 
218. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(b)(l)(i) (Supp. 1983). 
219. /d. § 297(b)(l)(iv). 
220. United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Nova, 560 F.2d 464, 469-70 (lst Cir. 1977) 
(construing 28 U.S.C. § 881). 
221. 268 Md. 349, 301 A.2d 498 (1973). 
222. /d. at 353, 301 A.2d at 500. 
223. 270 Md. 239, 244, 310 A.2d 768, 771 (1973). 
224. Subsections 297(b)(l) and (b)(4) of the former Maryland statute at issue in Geppi, 
Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(b)(l), (4) (1971), correspond to the current provi-
sions for arrest and probable cause, id. §§ 297(b)(l)(i) and (iv) (Supp. 1983). 
225. Geppi, 270 Md. at 245, 310 A.2d at 771. 
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The sole Maryland appellate case to directly analyze this question 
is Crowley v. State,226 a 1975 decision by the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland. In Crowley, a county deputy sheriff acting under a search 
warrant stopped and searched a vehicle and found a brick of marijuana 
on the floor of the back seat. The driver and the vehicle's occupants 
were then arrested and the vehicle impounded. A week later, acting 
without a warrant, the police again searched the vehicle and found 240 
LSD tablets.227 Referring to the second search of the vehicle, the Crow-
ley court recognized the inapplicability of a number of legal theories 
that normally legitimize searches of property: 
This search was not made under the authority of the search 
warrant which had been executed and returned. It was not 
made incident to an arrest, nor because of exigent circum-
stances. It was not made to take an inventory, nor to protect 
any personal property which may have been in the vehicle.22s 
Thus far, the court of special appeals had followed the same reasoning 
as the federal district court in United States v. McMichae/,229 an almost 
identical case. The similarities, however, stopped at that point. The 
court of special appeals found the search legal, basing its decision on 
subsections 297(a)(l) and (4),230 the categories making CDS and con-
veyances forfeitable, and subsection 297(f),231 which sets forth the stan-
dards for forfeiting motor vehicles. The court did not base its holding 
upon subsection 297(b),232 which governs the manner of seizure. The 
Crowley court relied upon the Supreme Court's language in Cooper v. 
Cal[(ornia 233 that: "we cannot hold unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment the examination or search of a car validly held by officers 
for use as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding."234 
The problem with the Cooper language is that the validity of the 
automobile's seizure in Cooper was never in question; rather, the issue 
before the Supreme Court was whether the vehicle could be 
searched.235 To cite Cooper for anything other than this is to extract 
more from the case than was decided. 
Therefore, Maryland appellate courts have never directly analyzed 
the statutory bases for the seizure of property subject to forfeiture. The 
226. 25 Md. App. 417, 334 A.2d 557 (1975). 
227. ld at 426, 334 A.2d at 562-63. 
228. ld 
229. 541 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1982). 
230. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(l), (4) (1971) (current provisions at id (Supp. 
1983)). 
231. ld § 297(f) (current provision at id (Supp. 1983)). 
232. ld § 297(b) (current provision at id (Supp. 1983)). 
233. 386 u.s. 58 (1976). 
234. Crowley v. State, 25 Md. App. 417, 426-27, 334 A.2d 557, 563 (1975) (quoting 
Cooper, 386 U.S. at 62). 
235. Cooper, 386 U.S. at 61. 
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discussion above as to the federal cases dealing with this question236 
demonstrates the inadequacy of the procedures in subsection 297(b). 
The exceptions in subsections 297(b)(l)(i) and (iv) are so broad that in 
a practical sense they eliminate the requirement that process be ob-
tained. In effect, subsection 297(b)(l), and in particular the first and 
fourth exceptions, gives Maryland law enforcement officers unlimited 
authority to seize property for forfeiture as long as they have probable 
cause to believe that the property has been used or is intended to be 
used in violation of the CDS laws, regardless of whether the seizure is a 
result of exigent circumstances or is a seizure planned well in advance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The 1982 amendments to section 297 have greatly expanded the 
types of property that can be seized and forfeited to the state in narcot-
ics cases. Since the number of seizures is likely to increase as a result of 
these amendments, courts will scrutinize the manner in which such 
seizures are made. Property now covered by subsections 297(a)(6) and 
(8) will generate more contested cases since claimants will argue that 
these assets, unlike contraband per se, were seized unjustly. The rule 
prevalent in most federal courts that no prior judicial approval is re-
quired before seizing property for forfeitures will likewise be tested. 
Cases in which automobiles are seized contemporaneously with an of-
fender's arrest will be replaced by more troublesome cases in which 
assets such as currency, stocks and bonds, and other personal property 
will be seized independently of other law enforcement events. If 
seizures occur when the officer had time to obtain prior judicial ap-
proval, courts may find that fourth amendment requirements overcome 
the warrantless probable cause provision of subsection 297(b)(l)(iv) 
and require that a warrant be obtained to seize the property. Such a 
rule, requiring probable cause and a warrant or some exception to the 
warrant requirement, would bring constitutional rules to an area of the 
law that has stood to one side as the rules surrounding the search of a 
citizen's property have undergone extensive development. Application 
of the exclusionary rule to forfeiture cases has failed to provide the 
constitutional protection this rule has given defendants in criminal 
cases. The actual seizure, as opposed to the evidence supporting the 
forfeiture, should be subject to the warrant requirements of the fourth 
amendment and, to ensure the effectiveness of the enforcement of this 
rule, the penalty for the unconstitutional seizure of property should be 
the dismissal of the forfeiture action itself. 
236. See supra notes 129-204 and accompanying text. 
